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BEYOND "THINKING LIKE A LAWYER" AND THE
TRADITIONAL LEGAL PARADIGM: TOWARD A
COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION
JESS M. KRANNICH, JAMES R. HOLBROOK, AND JULIE J. McADAMSt
INTRODUCTION
As anyone who is familiar with the annual U.S. News and World
Report survey of American law schools is aware, there are a great num-
ber of institutions engaged in the business of educating lawyers in this
country--currently, there are nearly two hundred accredited law
schools.' America's law schools have vastly different rates of enroll-
ment. For example, the Thomas M. Cooley School of Law reported
3,606 students enrolled for the 2006-2007 academic year, while the Uni-
versity of Montana School of Law reported 83 students.2 The size of the
schools' first-year entering classes also varies wildly. Again, the Tho-
mas M. Cooley School of Law was at the high end of the range in 2006,
with 1,691 first-year students entering its program last fall, while the
University of South Dakota welcomed only 72 first-year students.3 Giv-
en these ranges and the sheer number of law schools, both public and
private, it is clear that a vast number of students begin an education in
the field of law each year.
Despite the differences among American law schools, however, the
students' education will be remarkably similar, regardless of which insti-
tution they attend. Legal education-perhaps more than any other type
of instruction-is characterized by a distinctive teaching methodology
designed to create a common experience and mindset for all who are
exposed to it. A lawyer who was educated in Boston can tell a lawyer
who attended school in Los Angeles about the time his contracts profes-
sor questioned him regarding the rule of mitigation. Not only will the
lawyer from Los Angeles be familiar with the type of classroom dialogue
the lawyer from Boston is referring to, but he will likely also be able to
identify with the precise feelings the exchange engendered.
t Jess M. Krannich, Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP; J.D., University of Utah S.J. Quin-
ney College of Law; B.S., with Honors, University of Utah. James R. Holbrook, Clinical Professor
of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; J.D., University of Utah College of Law;
M.A., Indiana University; B.A., Grinnell College. Julie J. McAdams, Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; J.D., Columbia Law School; B.S., Utah State
University.
1. See U.S. News and World Report, Best Law Schools (2008), http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/grad/law/search.
2. See U.S. News and World Report, Best Law Schools Index (2008), http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/gradlaw/items.
3. Id.
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This common educational experience results from the fact that
American law schools have historically emphasized one specific skill-
known as "legal analysis," "legal reasoning," or simply "thinking like a
lawyer"-in their curricula, and have almost universally used a particular
type of instruction to develop this skill. Indeed, the foundation of mod-
em legal education is the institutionalized belief that students' legal apti-
tude is best developed through a classroom dialogue known as the "So-
cratic method," whereby professors force students to distill "rules" from
case law and apply those rules to various factual scenarios. This type of
instruction has dominated legal education for more than one hundred
years, and during that time legal reasoning has been the primary skill
taught to law students.
That law schools collectively focus on developing students' skill in
legal analysis is not, in and of itself, a problem. It is natural for those
who have been educated in a particular profession to have shared expe-
riences; certainly all medical students learn how to chart a patient's
progress. It is also beyond debate that legal reasoning is a crucial skill
for the legal practitioner, and is thus a necessary component of a proper
legal education. However, many law schools tend to focus on legal anal-
ysis to the exclusion of other equally important skills, and therefore give
students an incomplete understanding of legal practice. As a result, a
common perspective among new lawyers is that law school taught them
how to think like a lawyer, but if they wish to actually learn how to be a
lawyer, they must do so after earning their degree. This is a pessimistic,
but realistic, view for many students, and not one that we should be
proud of as educators. We should also be alarmed by the toll that the
standardized teaching methods take on many students. A wealth of re-
cent research has demonstrated that law schools' heavy emphasis on le-
gal analysis-and the teaching methodology that is used to develop this
skill-has unintended consequences that detrimentally impact students
both personally and professionally.
In the materials that follow, we first detail the historical underpin-
nings of traditional legal education and the impetus for law schools' fo-
cus on the skill of legal reasoning. We then discuss in depth the limita-
tions and consequences of this method of instruction. Finally, we ad-
dress the changes that have been occurring in the institutional culture of
legal education in recent years, changes that stem from the shortcomings
of the traditional model. As discussed below, we believe that these
changes are the harbinger of a broad shift in the nature of legal educa-
tion-a shift toward a more comprehensive, integrated approach de-
signed to teach students the broad range of skills and perspectives they
will need to succeed as professionals.
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I. TRADITIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE "PIGEON-HOLE" OF LEGAL
REASONING
Modem legal education can be traced to Dean Christopher Colum-
bus Langdell' s development of the case method as a tool for teaching the
skill of legal analysis at Harvard Law School in the 1870s.4 Prior to
Langdell's appointment to the deanship,
students were typically taught black-letter law by professors who lec-
tured from treatises, and they learned practical skills by applyingS •5
their knowledge in apprenticeships. Law was widely regarded as a
profession grounded in the humanities, and legal education took an
interdisciplinary approach emphasizing literature and philosophy.
6
Indeed, one of the profession's stalwarts, Judge Learned Hand, con-
sistently advocated an interdisciplinary approach to legal education
during his lifetime, believing "that law is centrally located in the hu-
manities, and is not complete unless it draws nourishment from
them.",7 Langdell, on the other hand, viewed law as a form of science
premised on a distinctive methodology-legal analysis.
8
For Langdell, "legal science" consisted, principally, of the art of
reading a relatively closed set of materials found in libraries: the deci-
sions of judges, particularly those at the appellate level. From these de-
cisions the legal scientist would then discern, through the power of legal
analysis, the structures of overarching doctrine that could unite such
seemingly disparate topics as the sale of potatoes and the sale of slaves
into one subject matter called "contracts." 9
Langdell thus viewed legal training as a process of learning how to
synthesize rules by dissecting cases, a process that was distinctly scien-
tific and did not require input from humanistic disciplines.10 Langdell's
4. See, e.g., Daniel R. Coquillette, The Legal Education of a Patriot: Josiah Quincy Jr.'s
Law Commonplace, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317, 324 (2007) (discussing Langdell's development of case
method of legal education at Harvard law School in 1870); Adam Todd, Neither Dead Nor Danger-
ous: Postmodernism and the Teaching of Legal Writing, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 893, 915-16 (2006)
("Most doctrinal law classes are taught in a modernist paradigm little changed from the pedagogical
classes introduced by Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School in 1870.... The professor is
seen as holding the truth or core knowledge about the subject and students are tested at the end of the
semester using exams where formalism and black letter law are expected to be mechanically applied
to limited fact patterns."); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Unea-
sy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 159-60 (2006) (discussing Langdell's influence on
"[t]he modem American legal academy" due to the prominence of the case method to develop the
skill of legal analysis (or, in the words of the authors, "legal craft")); Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our
Cake and Having it, Too: Why Real Change is So Difficult in Law Schools, 81 IND. L. J. 359, 374
n.26 (2006) ("Langdell's innovative methodology resulted not just in a new, optional pedagogical
tool, but became the foundational basis for what was to become established conventional practice in
American legal education." (citation omitted)).
5. Coquillette, supra note 4, at 323-24.
6. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4, at 155-57.
7. Id. at 157.
8. Id. at 159-60.
9. Id.
10. See Coquillette, supra note 4, at 324.
2009]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
theory was quickly put into practice at Harvard, and it soon became the
dominant view of legal education in America." In particular, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. helped champion Langdell's cause. In his legen-
dary speech entitled "The Path of the Law," delivered at the Boston Uni-
versity School of Law in 1897, Holmes endorsed a scientific perspective
of legal education, predicting that the future of legal academics would
rely more on economic theory than on philosophy.12 Holmes' speech
was certainly prophetic; Langdell's approach has remained in vogue for
more than a hundred years, and during that time the most prominent in-
terdisciplinary perspective to be introduced has been the law and eco-
nomics movement, the ultimate view of law as science. 1
3
In order to fulfill his "avowed mission.. . to transform American
legal education into 'scientific analysis, ' "14 Langdell devised a new me-
thod of instruction so powerful that it has persisted until the present day.
Known as the "case method," Langdell's model required professors to
teach using compilations of cases-typically from appellate courts-
known as casebooks, rather than treatises. 5 The compilations were or-
ganized by doctrinal topic, which had the additional effect of reorganiz-
ing Harvard's first-year curriculum into the core courses that are still
taught to nearly every IL student in America: constitutional law, con-
tracts, criminal law, property, torts, and civil procedure.' 6 Langdell's
case method was also designed to rely on a Socratic style of classroom
dialogue, instead of lectures, as the means of instructing students in legal
doctrine.' 7 In a typical Socratic class, the professor will pose questions
to the students about the cases they have been assigned to read for that
particular day. A Socratic law professor rarely indicates when his ques-
tions have been answered correctly, but instead manipulates the course of
the classroom dialogue so that the students themselves are forced to dis-
till the governing rules from the cases they have read. The relevant legal
principles are thus teased out through a nuanced discussion and applied
to various hypothetical scenarios devised by the professor. In many
ways, a Socratic professor functions as a conductor or puppet master,
carefully orchestrating the questions and arguments to guide the dis-
course in a preordained direction. A case method classroom therefore
centers on the professor himself, and the students typically view the pro-
fessor as holding the truth to the subject, but rarely revealing it. 8
Langdell's case method is a calculated means of developing a very
specific set of skills. Superficially, the case method trains students to
11. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4, at 160.
12. Id. at 157.
13. Id. at 159-60.
14. Id. at 159.
15. Coquillette, supra note 4, at 324.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Todd, supra note 4, at 916.
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synthesize overarching rules of law by dissecting raw cases and extract-
ing snippets of doctrine that, when viewed cumulatively, make up a body
of law in a particular subject. Students learn how to recognize not just
the rules used in certain cases, but also, hopefully, the policies animating
the rules. Without an understanding of the policies-historical, political,
economic, and social-upon which rules are premised, a lawyer cannot
truly master a particular area of law, for it is these policies that give the
rules both predictability and fairness. A lawyer who cannot grasp the
reasoning behind the evolution of rules from case to case-which re-
quires an understanding of the history and purposes of the field of law in
which the rules exist--cannot predict the future evolution of rules, which
is a key attribute for effective advocacy. In addition to teaching students
how to understand and synthesize rules of law, the case method also
trains students to apply the rules they have synthesized to specific dis-
putes. In fact, students' grades in nearly every first-year course are de-
termined by a single, comprehensive exam in which students must pre-
dict the legal outcome of hypothetical fact patterns devised by their pro-
fessor by applying the legal doctrine they have learned during the course
of the semester.
While the case method, on the surface, teaches students to recognize
and apply legal rules, its most profound impact is on the way students
think. Put simply, legal reasoning is a subtle thinking process in which
legal rules, as extrapolated from case law, are applied to facts, real or
hypothetical, to predict outcomes.19 The process is not an intuitive one,
and few students arrive at law school with an understanding of it. Prior
to law school, most students' academic experience has centered on me-
morizing information and supplying the right answers to professors'
questions, whether in class or on exams. Those who are qualified
enough to gain admittance to law school have obviously become adept at
this process, and many are surprised to find that it has little to do with
law school success. Indeed, most first-year students struggle, at least
initially, with the fact that the case method requires them to continually
try to answer questions that appear to have no "right" answer. The
process leaves many students feeling that their professors are "hiding the
ball." But the point of the case method is that there usually is not a right
answer; students are being trained to analyze disputes a certain way, ra-
ther than to solve the particular issues at hand.
19. This definition of legal reasoning, which is the best we have found in all our research, is
taken from a classroom handout that John J. Flynn, Hugh B. Brown Professor Emeritus of Law at the
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, frequently gave to his first-year students. The
handout is entitled "Why 'Why'?," and it provides an excellent description of why first-year doctrin-
al courses are taught as they are, explaining that the skill of legal reasoning is an inductive, not
deductive, thinking process that is best learned when students are forced to struggle with questions
having no apparent right answer. We are deeply indebted to Professor Flynn for his wisdom and
insight, which informs much of the content in this section. For those who have further interest,
Professor Flynn's handout remains on file with the authors. John J. Flynn, Why "Why"? (unpub-
lished handout, on file with authors).
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From the moment they set foot in their IL classrooms, first year law
students are being initiated into a distinctive method of thinking that will
forever alter the way they analyze disputes. Non-lawyers typically view
disputes from a narrative standpoint, focusing on the "story" of the cha-
racters involved. 20  This perspective tends to emphasize the social and
interpersonal dynamics involved in situations of conflict. 21  And most
law students initially approach their coursework from this perspective,
focusing on the story behind each case they read.22  In class, however,
students quickly learn that law professors are not interested in narrative
accounts of disputes and do not particularly care about the relationships
or emotions of the characters involved. Rather, in a case method class-
room students are encouraged to focus on only the strategic positions of
the parties.23 Through Socratic questioning, professors prompt students
to reframe the narratives involved in the cases students have read by or-
ganizing the "facts" in terms of legal claims and precedent. 24 Students
are repeatedly encouraged to siphon all non-essential facts from the dis-
putes they analyze and to focus instead on only those facts relevant to the
specific legal principles at issue.25 Form is thus elevated over substance,
and students are conditioned to disregard the emotional, interpersonal,
moral, and social consequences of disputes as extraneous concerns that
will only confuse the legal analysis to be performed.26  Students quickly
learn "that to 'think like a lawyer' means redefining messy situations of
actual or potential conflict as opportunities for advancing a client's cause
through legal argument before a judge., 27 Many come to see legal rea-
soning as a tool used to formalistically "pigeon-hole" the facts of a par-
20. See, e.g., 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 869, 874-75 (2007) (reviewing and summarizing
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A LAWYER"
(Oxford 2007) and Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist
Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REv. 483, 494-95 (2007) ("When students attempt to tell the stories of
conflict embodied in the cases assigned for their courses, they typically start by focusing on the
content of the story.") [hereinafter Mertz Summary]); Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession:
The Comprehensive Law Movement, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 6 (2006) (non-lawyers tend to
focus on personal aspects of disputes).
21. See Daicoff, supra note 20, at 6 (citing Sandra Janoff, The Influences of Legal Education
on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REv. 193, 219-22 (1991) and CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE 17-21 (1982)).
22. See Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 494-95.
23. Id. at 498-99.
24. See id. at 493-94; see also WILLIAM M. SuLLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 187 (The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching 2006) (discussing effects of case method style of instruction on first-year law students)
[hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
25. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187 ("[S]tudents are led to analyze situations by
looking for points of dispute or conflict and considering as 'facts' only those details that contribute
to someone's staking a legal claim on the basis of precedent."); Daicoff, supra note 20, at 5 ("Law
schools traditionally teach students to sift through facts and issues to eliminate 'irrelevant' concerns
and focus only on what is 'relevant' to the rule of law. The emotional and interpersonal dynamics of
a matter are deemed irrelevant to the pure legal analysis learned in the first year of law school.").
26. See Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 498-99; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187-
88.
27. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187.
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ticular dispute into legally relevant categories, discarding those that can-
not be so categorized.
The pedagogical power of the case method and its accompanying
Socratic classroom dialogue cannot be denied. In an extremely short
educational period, the case method forces students "to grasp the law as a
subject characterized by a particular way of thinking, a distinctive stance
toward the world., 28 As the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement
of Teaching ("Carnegie Foundation") found in its recent ground-breaking
study of legal education:
Within months of their arrival in law school, students demonstrate
new capacities for understanding the legal processes, for seeing both
sides of legal arguments, for sifting through facts and precedents in
search of the more plausible account, for using precise language, and
for understanding the applications and conflicts of legal rules. De-
spite a wide variety of social backgrounds and undergraduate expe-
riences, they are learning, in the parlance of legal education, to "think
like a lawyer."
29
From this perspective, the case method must be viewed as a re-
sounding success, a nearly fool-proof strategy for training students in the
art of legal reasoning. And because legal analysis is uniformly priori-
tized in legal education-the doctrinal courses at nearly every law school
(the majority of which are encompassed in the standardized first-year
curriculum) overwhelmingly rely on the case method-there "is a strik-
ing conformity in outlook and habits of thought among legal gra-
duates., 30 Regardless of their patterns of thought prior to law school,
students leave law school with the ability to cull legally relevant facts
from complicated disputes and organize those facts around persuasive
legal arguments.
While the uniformity with which law schools produce students
skilled in legal reasoning is an impressive feat, the flip-side of the coin is
that, by heavily prioritizing such training, schools are also uniformly
creating the same deficiencies. Indeed, Langdell's methodology has
been so successful that law schools have steadfastly adhered to it, even in
the face of mounting empirical research demonstrating that the tradition-
al methods of instruction suffer from major shortcomings. 3' As dis-
cussed in the following section, the case method of legal instruction,
when used in isolation, has many unintended consequences that ultimate-
ly impair lawyers' professional development and well-being. The com-
bined effect of these consequences has resulted in an imbalance in Amer-
28. Id.
29. Id. at 186.
30. Id.
31. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 4, at 160.
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ican legal education and in the practice of law, an imbalance that can be
corrected by a more comprehensive approach to legal instruction.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION
While there is no question that the traditional model of legal educa-
tion produces dramatic results, it also has equally dramatic and unin-
tended consequences. At most law schools, the genius of Langdell's
methodology has not been matched by an equally well-considered means
of instructing students in legal practice. Legal institutions have mastered
the process of teaching students how to think like lawyers, but not the
process of "teaching students how to use legal thinking in the complexity
of actual law practice. '32 Courses that emphasize practical skills and
real-world training typically hold a subordinate place to doctrinal courses
in most law schools' curricula.33 Furthermore, the course offerings that
are designed to prepare students for the practice of law are not nearly as
synchronized or refined as the doctrinal part of the curriculum, and there
is little integration between the two types of courses. 34 In the required
portion of legal education, which is primarily doctrinal, students are in-
undated with training in legal reasoning via a coordinated set of "core"
classes. But most students are then left to tailor the remainder of their
law school experience, including any practical courses they wish to take,
haphazardly. Because little emphasis is placed on direct training in pro-
fessional practice, legal analysis thus overshadows the entirety of stu-
dents' education, "conveying the impression that lawyers are more like
competitive scholars than attorneys engaged with the problems of
clients. 35 Most students' educational experience is therefore dominated
by the process of learning to "think like a lawyer. ' 36 The result of this
unbalanced and inaccurate perspective is that many students spend the
third (and even second) year of law school figuratively treading water,
having been taught the skill of legal reasoning but not provided a struc-
tured way to place this skill in the context of legal practice.37 The second
two years of law school thus provide diminishing returns in terms of stu-
dents' educational advancement, with a great number of students simply
waiting to graduate and begin practice even though they have little
knowledge of what the practice of law actually entails.38 While this gap
between education and practice highlights a major inefficiency in Ameri-
can legal education, the more alarming consequence is that America's
32. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 188 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. See id. at 194.
35. Id. at 188.
36. Id. at 186.
37. See id. at 195.
38. See id. at 77.
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law schools are not producing lawyers equipped with the skills necessary
to thrive as professionals.39
When the skill of legal reasoning is considered within the context of
the actual practice of law, it is clear why the focus of the case method is
so narrow. The American judicial system is premised on an adversarial,
winner-take-all approach to dispute resolution in which legal rules are
formalistically applied to the facts of a particular conflict and the party
with the more persuasive position is assigned the contested resource.40
Traditional legal education is deliberately geared toward developing the
primary skill needed to operate within this system; the case method drills
students to focus exclusively on the legal rights, liabilities, obligations,
duties, and entitlements present in a given fact pattern.41 To this end,
students are trained to disregard all facts and consequences that are out-
side the precise legal issue at hand and recognize as relevant only those
42facts that pertain to the legal tests that will be used in court. This pur-
poseful simplification of conflicts removes all peripheral issues from the
equation, preventing students from being distracted by moral concerns or
compassion and allowing them to focus solely on honing their analytical
skills.43 From a litigation standpoint, this perspective makes sense: to
zealously represent or advise a client faced with a lawsuit, a lawyer must
be able to evaluate and marshal the facts presented by the client by refer-
ence to the law that will apply to the dispute in court. 44 Legal analysis is
therefore an essential skill for lawyers practicing in the American legal
system, but it is far from the only skill needed, even for litigators.
In practice, lawyers provide analysis, advocacy, and advice to both
people and organizations regarding an infinite number of different trans-
actions, disputes, and problems, both legal and non-legal. To provide
competent representation to their clients,45 all lawyers, regardless of spe-
cialty, must draw on a vast array of skills and perspectives beyond the
pure legal analysis that is emphasized in law school. For example (and
39. Of course, a great many law students who are successful at learning legal analysis are also
successful at learning practical skills during their first few years after graduation. But the point is
that law school is, for most students, the only opportunity to learn practical legal skills in a simu-
lated, structured environment. By not emphasizing and integrating this aspect of the curriculum, law
schools are failing to provide crucial and necessary training to the next generation of practicing
attorneys.
40. ROBERT A. BARUSCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 56-58 (Jossey-Bass Pub-
lishers 1994).
41. See Daicoff, supra note 20, at 5.
42. Id.
43. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187.
44. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002) ("A lawyer must ... act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of a client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf.").
45. Id. R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably neces-
sary for the representation.").
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without attempting to be exhaustive), every lawyer needs excellent social
and ethical skills. 46 Despite the rapid growth and change that has oc-
curred in recent years, the legal profession remains a people-centered
business.47 Attorneys interact with a large assortment of characters, in-
cluding clients, potential clients, co-workers, opposing lawyers, experts,
witnesses, and judges. It is therefore crucial that practicing attorneys
have well-developed, versatile communication skills and a proficiency
for interpersonal relations. Yet, it is surprising how many attorneys are
deficient in these areas. Law schools rarely train students in these skills
in any structured manner, and thus the lawyers who have excellent com-
munication abilities are either those who are naturally endowed with
them or those who have developed such skills through trial and error in
practice. 48 Indeed, two of the most common complaints lodged against
the legal profession are that lawyers "tend to put process above people"
and that "certain mindsets and attitudes stand between [clients] and the
lawyers they hire.",49 Analysis is important, but it must be placed in con-
text and it should not come at the expense of lawyers' abilities to relate
to the people with whom they must interact.
Similarly, because of the countless relationships and dilemmas with
which they are faced, practicing lawyers are regularly forced to consider
the moral and ethical implications of various courses of action. It is es-
sential for lawyers to appear to-and to actually-have firm morals and
ethics because the legitimacy of the legal profession depends on the inte-
grity of its members. And while ethics are taught in law school, typically
via an upper-level course focusing on the rules that govern attorneys'
conduct, the importance of moral and ethical considerations is minimized
when these concerns are purposely excluded by the case method, only to
be reintroduced in an isolated fashion later.50 When morals and ethics
are segregated in this manner, students are left with the impression that
such matters are irrelevant for purposes of law school success and, by
correlation, secondary to what counts in practice.5' Students are also
rarely given the opportunity to explore moral and ethical issues in simu-
lated practice settings, and thus enter practice with only a marginal un-
derstanding of the manner in which these issues may affect their practical
responsibilities as professionals.
52
46. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 187-88.
47. See, e.g., LARRY RICHARD & SUSAN RARIDON LAMBRETH, MAKING LAWYERS INTO
LEADERS (2006), available at http://www.hildebrandt.com/Documents.aspx?Doc-ID=2476 (discuss-
ing "the tremendous change affecting the legal profession generally and law firms specifically").
48. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6 (discussing law schools' general failure
to develop law students' ethical and social skills).
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Every practicing attorney must also be equipped with a broad set of
problem-solving skills. At base, lawyers are advisors and advocates who
use their expertise to help clients solve legal problems. To provide tho-
rough and competent counsel to clients, lawyers must take into account
an immense number of disparate issues, both legal and non-legal. This
requires the ability to view legal problems comprehensively and from
many different perspectives. While the problems lawyers are called
upon to solve frequently require the skill of legal reasoning, this is not
always the case, and legal reasoning is rarely the exclusive skill needed.
For example, a lawyer representing an automobile parts supplier in a
breach of contract dispute with a manufacturer will probably need to
assess the likelihood of prevailing if the case should go to trial. But if
the parties engage in settlement discussions, the lawyer will also need to,
among other things, discuss and consider the client's goals (including
non-legal goals, such as business productivity and good will), conduct a
detailed risk analysis that takes into account the costs and benefits of
various non-litigation alternatives, devise a negotiation strategy in light
of the various personalities and interests involved, and negotiate the po-
tential settlement. This is a scenario that practicing lawyers face on a
regular basis, for settlement is a possibility in virtually every lawsuit and,
statistically speaking, is an exponentially more likely outcome than tri-
al.53 Yet, the tasks described above require perspectives and skills that
are much more broadly-focused and nuanced than the pure legal analysis
that is emphasized in doctrinal law school courses.
As another example, consider the issues an attorney representing a
party in a bitter divorce action might face. Legal analysis is often less
important in such situations because most states have enacted no-fault
divorce statutes, 54 and the parties' respective factual positions relative to
the applicable law therefore often have less impact on the outcome.55
Extralegal concerns may in fact be far more important. For instance, the
parties may view the psychological and emotional impact of the divorce
as the most important issue because they have young children and will
need to maintain a cordial relationship going forward. They may want
family counseling to be an important component of the separation
agreement in order to provide a forum for the children to deal with their
feelings. They may see the children's education as a crucial concern, and
want to prioritize this issue in discussing the financial ramifications of
53. Cf David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, and Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitra-
tion of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a
New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 150 (1999).
54. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/406 (West 2007).
55. Of course, legal analysis may still be relevant in such situations. The parties may, for
example, dispute the amount of alimony that should be paid. The resolution of this issue will depend
largely on the parties' respective earning capacities and the pre-divorce standard of living, evaluated
in light of the applicable statute. This is obviously a classic example of legal analysis. Our point,
however, is that other concerns often dominate divorce proceedings, and extralegal considerations
will likely remain relevant even when legal analysis is necessary to resolve a specific issue.
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the divorce. The parties' needs in a situation such as this have very little
to do with legal analysis, and their interests will likely not be served if
they become embroiled in protracted litigation. To effectively represent
the parties in such a scenario, the lawyers must therefore be able to take
into account a variety of extralegal concerns, such as the emotional con-
sequences of various courses of action, and must be able to carefully
manage the tensions between the parties. Obviously, training in legal
analysis does not equip a lawyer to provide such representation; rather,
the case method encourages students to ignore such concerns.56
Recent research has also shown that leadership skills are tremend-
ously valuable to practicing attorneys but, like social, ethical, and prob-
lem-solving skills, are not purposely taught or adequately emphasized in
law school. 57 This should not be surprising, for leadership is a "people-
focused, inspirational, emotional, non-linear and visceral" skill, and most
of these qualities are de-emphasized by traditional legal education.
58
Law school graduates have a tendency to be "less sociable and more
skeptical, urgent, analytical, autonomous, and more defensive and thin-
skinned than the general public-by a wide margin. 59 While these cha-
racteristics make us good legal analysts, they usually also make us medi-
ocre leaders. Leadership is a skill that is based on one's ability to exhibit
certain key behaviors; because these behaviors can be learned, leadership
can also be learned. 60 According to Larry Richard and Hillary Lambreth,
the key behaviors include: thinking outside the box and experimenting
with new and better ways of doing things; advocating positive, forward-
looking goals; collaborating with, encouraging, and praising co-workers
rather than hoarding power; acting in accordance with the values and
principles to which others are held; and being self-aware enough to take
responsibility for and determine how to overcome setbacks.61 Certainly
these behaviors could be incorporated into legal education-for example,
by teaching certain practice-based courses using a team-based approach
and encouraging students to brainstorm both legal and non-legal solu-
tions to problems. Currently, however, law schools rarely take such con-
siderations into account, and the case method of instruction does little to
promote these behaviors.
Not only does the singular focus of traditional legal education fail to
adequately develop the full range of skills students will need as lawyers,
56. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6 ("[The task of connecting [legal] con-
clusions with the rich complexity of actual situations that involve full-dimensional people, let alone
the job of thinking through the social consequences or ethical aspects of the conclusions, remains
outside the case-dialogue method."); Daicoff, supra note 20, at 6 ("[lI]n law school, emotional and
interpersonal concerns are strongly de-emphasized, if not blatantly ignored.").
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but the teaching methods themselves also have a detrimental impact on
law students. The case method is designed to require summative assess-
ments in which students' competence in doctrinal subjects is measured
solely by comprehensive examinations given at the end of the semester.62
The usual result of summative assessments is to rank, sort, and filter
those being assessed.63 Certainly this is most students' experience with
the high-stakes exams given during the first year of law school, which
have the effect of opening academic and career options for some students
and closing them for others. 64 In certain situations, summative assess-
ments are a preferable form of evaluation. For example, the bar exami-
nation is a summative assessment designed to create a barrier to entry in
the legal profession by ensuring that those who are admitted have basic
levels of competency.65 Such an examination may be desirable in some
law school courses, but the dominance of this form of evaluation in law
schools is troubling. Studies have shown that formative assessments-in
which students are evaluated periodically, allowing educators to better
chart and encourage students' progress-are far more conducive to learn-
ing.66  Yet, formative evaluations are rarely utilized in law school
classes.67 If law schools' mission is truly to educate, then schools should
consider using a variety of teaching methodologies so that students' ca-
pacity for learning is maximized.
The prominence of the case method in legal education also has a
proven negative impact on students' psyches. By forcing students to
narrowly focus on only the legal consequences of disputes, the case me-
thod excludes the social context in which disputes occur from students'
frames of reference. 68 For purposes of instructing students in legal anal-
ysis, this is an effective strategy. But law schools typically reintroduce
the social, moral, interpersonal, psychological, and emotional dynamics
of legal issues haphazardly, if at all, leaving students to determine on
their own the relevance of such issues to legal practice.69 As discussed
above, this frequently leaves students with the misimpression that such
concerns are irrelevant in legal practice when, in fact, nothing could be
further from the truth. But the lack of attention given to such matters in
traditional legal education also has another, more personal consequence.
Many students find the narrow, formalistic approach emphasized in law
school to be disillusioning because it discourages the ideals and goals
that bring a great many students to law school in the first place, such as






68. See Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 5; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6.
69. See Daicoff, supra note 20, at 5-6; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6-7.
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helping people or promoting social justice.70 On one hand, the case me-
thod eliminates misconceptions about how the law works; in a great
many individual cases the law operates in a manner counter to students'
ideals and aspirations, and legal results are often reached without refer-
ence to social or moral consequences. 7' But one would hope that law-
yers, as officers of the American judicial system, aspire to something
greater in their representation of clients than the simple ability to mani-
pulate legal rules. When law students are conditioned to believe that the
practice of law entails nothing more, they are forced to either shift their
goals and values or reluctantly accept the hand they have been dealt.
Commentators have found that both types of changes regularly occur in
law students, resulting in a great deal of cynicism and anxiety.72
For example, Kennon M. Sheldon and Lawrence S. Krieger recently
completed a three-year longitudinal study of law students at two different
law schools.73 The first school heavily emphasized abstract legal theory
and analysis in its curriculum, while the second attempted to integrate
this traditional approach with a heavy dose of practical skills training.74
Using a variety of statistical tests, Sheldon and Krieger measured the
students' well-being as they progressed through law school.75  The re-
sults of the study are striking. At both schools, the students experienced
a decline in emotional and psychological well-being.76 Sheldon and
Krieger attribute this decline to multiple factors. First, they found that
the students experienced a dramatic shift in their value systems during
law school, from a generally intrinsic focus to a generally extrinsic fo-
70. See, e.g., Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 5 ("[T]he way legal reasoning is taught and
practiced creates a closed linguistic system that is capable of devouring all manner of social detail,
but without budging from its core assumptions." (internal quotation marks omitted)); CARNEGIE
REPORT, supra note 24, at 6 ("Students often find [the exclusion of moral concerns from their train-
ing in legal analysis] confusing and disillusioning. The fact that moral concerns are reintroduced
only haphazardly conveys a cynical impression of the law that is rarely intended.").
71. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6.
72. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Book Review, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 454, 464 (2005) (re-
viewing JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, How LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION
FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS (Duke Univ. Press 2005) ("On a personal level, lawyers confront stories
that evoke visceral moral responses; on a professional level, they are consistently denied recourse to
those responses when they do their work. ... It's easy to see that this can be a recipe for cynicism
and despair, because it undermines the very notion that human beings can achieve a degree of moral
order by establishing a legal system."); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal
Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values,
and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. Sci. & LAW 261, 283 (2004) (finding that students generally experience
increasing distress during law school associated with a shift in values and perspectives) [hereinafter
Sheldon & Krieger: Motivation, Values, and Well-Being].
73. Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal
Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test and Extension of Self-Determination Theory, PERS.
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.consol3papers.cfm?
abstractid--913824 [hereinafter Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects].
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. at 15-19.
76. Id. at 4.
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cus.
7 7 On entering law school, most students' values were oriented to-
ward societal contribution, helping others, emotional connections, and
personal growth.78 Over the course of law school, however, students
became less likely to act based on personal interest or inherent satisfac-
tion and more likely to act based on extrinsic rewards such as image,
appearance, and prestige. 79 This shift in values understandably caused a
great deal of distress for the students, for it represented a change in many
students' self identities. 80 Sheldon and Krieger also found that the stu-
dents' levels of need satisfaction declined during law school, resulting in
an overall loss of motivation.8 1 Their studies linked the decline in need
satisfaction to lower levels of autonomy (i.e., feelings of independence
and self-sufficiency), intrinsic satisfaction (i.e., the ability to satisfy per-
sonal needs and values), and psychological satisfaction (i.e., feelings of
competence and relatedness to others).82
According to Sheldon and Krieger, the methodology of traditional
legal education is primarily responsible for the decline in well-being that
they identified.83  While students' emotional and psychological well-
being declined at both schools, it declined much more precipitously at
the school that heavily emphasized legal theory.84 Sheldon and Krieger
found that this disparity resulted from the difference in social contexts at
the two schools.85 When the social context in law school supports stu-
dents' autonomy, gives them balanced interdisciplinary training, and
focuses on satisfying students' psychological needs, such as competence
and relatedness, students' need satisfaction increases. 86 And when stu-
dents' needs are satisfied, their emotional well-being and psychological
health is enhanced, their performance (as measured by, for example,
GPA) improves, and their self-determined job motivation increases.87
Self-determined job motivation is a particularly important gauge of insti-
tutional success, for it is highly correlative with professional achieve-
ment and fulfillment after graduation. 88 Unhappy lawyers make unpro-
fessional lawyers, and therefore we must train law students in a way that
77. Id.; see also Sheldon & Krieger: Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at
272-83 (discussing law students' shift in values during law school).
78. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects, supra note 73, at 4; Sheldon & Krieger: Motiva-
tion, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at 264-78.
79. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects, supra note 73, at 4; Sheldon & Krieger: Motiva-
tion, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at 272-83.
80. See, e.g., Sheldon & Krieger: Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at 283
(discussing law student distress).
81. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative effects, supra note 73, at 4-5, 28-32.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 28-33.
84. Id. at 11, 21.
85. Id. at 11, 32.
86. Id. at 28-33.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 31.
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promotes intrinsic fulfillment and encourages them to pursue personally
satisfying career options.
However, traditional legal education, with its formalistic use of the
case method and narrow focus on legal analysis, does not provide a so-
cial atmosphere conducive to students' intrinsic needs. 90 In fact, when
used in isolation, the standard methods of legal instruction tend to stifle
students' needs and promote a shift in values that is detrimental to stu-
dents and, consequently, to the profession.9' Sheldon and Krieger sug-
gest that even schools that focus primarily on teaching legal analysis can
foster a culture that improves students' well-being by, for example, fo-
cusing on student concerns, providing students with choices, and includ-
ing rationales and explanations for mandatory requirements.92 But their
study also found that law schools with a balanced, comprehensive curri-
culum are much more likely to create such a culture because students
who are given the opportunity to learn and implement a larger range of
legal skills have increased feelings of independence and competence.
93
Thus, the second school in Sheldon and Krieger's study was able to tem-
per the negative effects they identified by balancing the development of
traditional legal skills with application-based practical courses.94
Analyses such as Sheldon and Krieger's help explain the alarming
rates of depression, cynicism, and career dissatisfaction that afflict the
legal profession. Recent studies have shown that lawyers suffer depres-
sion at a rate four times higher than the general population; in fact, in a
study of more than 100 professions, lawyers had the highest incidence of
depression.95 In a survey of lawyers with six to nine years of experience,
only forty one percent reported being satisfied with their career.96 Of
that same group, only thirty-five percent would recommend a legal ca-
reer to a young person.97 Commentators have attributed these ills to the
general lack of intrinsic fulfillment and intrapersonal development in the
legal profession, 98 problems that, as demonstrated by Sheldon and Krieg-
89. See Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfac-
tion: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, II CLINICAL L. REV. 425, 426 (2005).
90. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative effects, supra note 73, at 4-5, 28-33.
91. See id. at 3-4 (noting that the case method style of instruction, when used in isolation,
"thwart[s] the needs and preferences of typical law students" because it "train[s] students to ignore
their own values and moral sense, undermine[s] students' sense of identity and self-confidence, and
create[s] cynicism"); see also Sheldon & Krieger: Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, note 72, at
272-83 (discussing impact of traditional legal training on law students' values).
92. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative effects, supra note 73, at 5-6.
93. Id. at 32.
94. Id. at 11, 32.
95. Joan E. Mounteer, Depression Among Lawyers, 33 CoLO. LAW., Jan. 2004, at 36, 37,
available at http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl-articles.cfmArticlelD=2963.
96. Stephanie F. Ward, Pulse of the Legal Profession, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2007,
http://www.abajoumal.commagazine/pulse-of-the-legal-profession.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Daicoff, supra note 20, at 53-54 (noting that the "crisis" facing the legal profes-
sion is that many lawyers' do not have the "ability to know themselves well").
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er, can be traced back to a lawyer's education. 99 In an educational sys-
tem that promotes such a rapid shift in thought processes-away from
intrinsic fulfillment and growth-it should come as little surprise that
disillusionment reverberates through many lawyers' early careers, partic-
ularly when the intrinsic impact legal education has on who law students
are as people is not addressed at an institutional level.
In summary, legal analysis is merely the tip of the iceberg in terms
of the skills practicing lawyers require. None of the skills discussed in
this section are taught in a structured manner or even emphasized in most
law schools' curricula, yet all are crucial for professional success. Thus,
when the case method is used in isolation and legal analysis is empha-
sized to the exclusion of other important skills and perspectives, students
are being short-changed because they are trained to analyze disputes
from only one narrow point of view. Students graduate with an incom-
plete set of tools and are therefore ill-prepared for the variety of situa-
tions they will face as practicing attorneys. The dominant methods of
legal instruction also have a negative emotional and psychological im-
pact on students, causing a shift in perspectives and values that fosters
cynicism and distress. The failure of legal institutions to attend to stu-
dents' well-being and satisfaction has a tendency to create disillusioned
students, and this does not serve those being educated, the profession, or
society as a whole. As educators, we can do better. Law schools are
institutions of higher learning, and their educational mission should be to
educate the best lawyers possible. When schools are instead churning
out masses of unprepared, disenchanted practitioners, it is time to reeva-
luate our teaching methodologies. With this background in mind, the
following section examines the changes currently underway in legal edu-
cation and suggests an approach that will both give students more com-
prehensive training in legal practice and also maximize the personal ben-
efit students receive from their law school experience.
1II. TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Law is a profession of immense depth, and it would be impossible
to convey a full understanding of all its nuances and intricacies during a
mere three-year instructional period. Indeed, legal education is a process
that can never be viewed as "complete," for law is never static and those
who practice it will continue to update their doctrinal knowledge and
hone their skills throughout their careers. The best lawyers are those that
remain eager to learn and improve their craft long after they have accu-
mulated enough experience to be considered seasoned practitioners.
Thus, law school must be viewed as the beginning of students' legal edu-
cation rather than an experience that will impart everything they need to
99. Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects, supra note 73, at 4; Sheldon & Krieger: Motiva-
tion, Values, and Well-Being, supra note 72, at 272-83.
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know for a career as a lawyer. Nonetheless, the significance of the insti-
tutional failures that are occurring in American law schools cannot be
overstated. Law school is the singular experience that unites all mem-
bers of the legal profession, "where the profession puts its defining val-
ues and exemplars on display, and future practitioners can begin both to
assume and critically examine their future identities."0° When law stu-
dents are educated in a manner that is not only inadequate but also fos-
ters cynicism and distress, the entire profession suffers and, correspon-
dingly, so does society in general. After all, lawyers are officers of the
court, and the legal profession is the sole supplier of personnel for the
judicial branch of our government, which is sworn to serve the public by
justly deciding disputes. The training this nation's legal institutions im-
part to future lawyers is vital to the successful functioning of American
democracy. 10 It is therefore crucial that law schools redefine their edu-
cational mission and begin to train students in more of the skills and
perspectives they will need to maximize their success as professionals.
Reforming the institution of legal education will not be easy. It is a
testament to the pedagogical power of Langdell's approach that the case
method remains firmly entrenched as the dominant form of legal instruc-
tion despite mounting criticism in recent years. And while all institu-
tional cultures are generally resistant to change, legal education may be
even more so. The prevailing mindset in the profession is not one that
encourages change; most educators have been trained to "think like a
lawyer" and contest conflicting information, rather than alter their ap-
proach when contradictory data are presented. 10 2 Furthermore, because
the current regime has morphed into a reliable method of sorting students
for prestigious law firms and the government, 0 3 the most influential ac-
tors in the profession do not have a strong incentive to promote
reform. 104
Nonetheless, American legal education has been gradually evolving
in spite of these obstacles. Indeed, law students currently receive more
practical skills training and are exposed to a broader range of interdiscip-
100. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 4.
101. Carnegie Foundation, Carnegie Examines the Education of Lawyers and Calls for Change,
2007, http://www.camegiefoundation.org/news/sub.asp?key=51 &subkey=2152 ("The calling of
legal educators is a high one-to prepare future professionals with enough understanding, skill and
judgment to support the vast and complicated system of the law needed to sustain the United States
as a free society worthy of its citizens' loyalty.").
102. See, e.g., Mertz Summary, supra note 20, at 5-6 (contrasting the mindset of those trained
in legal reasoning with "that of academics in, for example, social sciences, who are forced, at least
eventually, to revise their theories when confronted with conflicting or contradictory data").
103. Steven W. Keeva, Practicing From the Inside Out, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 97, 105
(2002).
104. On the other hand, legal employers would ultimately benefit if law schools reliably pro-
duced more self-aware, well-rounded lawyers. Not only would new lawyers enter the workforce
with a larger set of skills, but they would also be more in touch with their professional goals and
desires, and would thus be less likely to leave their jobs (or the profession) at such a rapid rate.
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linary perspectives than ever before. 10 5 For example, many law students
now receive real world legal experience through clinical programs,"°6 and
the vast majority of law schools offer courses that teach practical legal
skills such as interviewing, counseling, and negotiation.107 In addition, a
variety of novel approaches to legal practice have sprung up within just
the last ten years and have been incorporated to some extent in law
school curricula. Examples of these alternative approaches include: "(1)
collaborative law, (2) creative problem solving, (3) holistic justice, (4)
preventive law, (5) problem solving courts, (6) procedural justice, (7)
restorative justice, (8) therapeutic jurisprudence, and (9) transformative
mediation."10 8 These recent developments are all responsive to the di-
lemma of traditional legal education outlined previously; in law school,
students are trained in analysis, issue-spotting, fact siphoning, and logical
deduction but regularly need a broader and more dynamic skill-set to
solve the problems with which they are confronted in practice. 109 The
skills and perspectives making their way into legal education have thus
developed to fill the vacuum created by the case method's singular focus.
Many of these perspectives are interdisciplinary in nature and are de-
signed to provide lawyers with a different "lens" through which to view
disputes or problems. 01 For example, therapeutic jurisprudence is a dis-
tinctly psychological practice in which lawyers consider the effect of
legal options on the well-being of the characters involved in a particular
dispute in addition to the usual legal concerns, such as rights and du-
ties."' "[G]iven two different options for achieving a particular legal
result, if one option is more therapeutic than the other, the lawyer should
attempt to pursue the more therapeutic course of action."'1 2 Similarly,
the discipline of creative problem solving is "a broad approach to solving
legal problems that takes into account a wide variety of non-legal issues
and concerns and then seeks creative, win-win solutions to otherwise
win-lose scenarios.""' 3 While traditional legal analysis is often a starting
point, a creative problem solving approach encourages students to ex-
plore options and solutions beyond what would result from the formal
application of legal rules." 14
Although the recent advances in legal education encompass a varie-
ty of skills and approaches, the reforms all share several common pers-
105. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 189 ("Compared to fifty years ago, law
schools now provide students with more experience, more contextual experience, more choice and
more connection with the larger university world and other disciplines.").
106. Daicoff, supra note 20, at 47.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).
109. Id. at 46.
110. Id. at 10.
111. Seeid. at ll-12.
112. Id. at 12.
113. Id. at 20.
114. Id. at 20-21.
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pectives. First, an interdisciplinary view of legal practice in which extra-
legal concerns such as resources, goals, morals, values, psychological
well-being, and interpersonal relations are integrated with legal reason-
ing is becoming increasingly prominent." 15 A second and related devel-
opment is that a broad problem-solving approach to dispute resolution is
being stressed instead of the narrow focus of pure legal analysis. Finally,
many of the changes represent an implicit recognition of the personal
nature of legal practice and the corresponding need for lawyers to devel-
op excellent human relations and communication skills. 1 6 These com-
mon threads have led some commentators to refer to the changes cumu-
latively as the "comprehensive law movement"' 7 or "postmodern" legal
education." 8 Viewed collectively, the recent reforms reflect a gradually
increasing shift back to legal education's humanistic roots as law schools
broaden their curricula and begin exposing students to a more diverse
range of skills and perspectives.
While the focus of legal education has certainly changed during the
last fifty years, the reforms have not yet stimulated the type of improve-
ments that are necessary to maximize students' law school experience.
Most of the changes that have occurred "have been more piecemeal than
comprehensive. ' 19 In other words, most law schools have treated alter-
native skills and perspectives in an additive fashion, refusing to intrude
on the priority given to training in legal analysis. 120 Courses in, for ex-
ample, practical legal skills are thus subordinated to doctrinal training
and are not integrated into the curriculum or developed to the extent that
traditional courses are. 121  Although the majority of students graduate
with a well-developed capacity for legal analysis, most are still trained in
other crucial skills only haphazardly. 122 As a result, the deficiencies
identified in the prior section persist.
123
What is needed is an integrated, comprehensive approach to legal
education. In his revolutionary book, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and
Practice of the Learning Organization, Peter Senge gives the DC-3, the
world's first twin engine airplane that was introduced in 1935, as an ex-
ample of a comprehensive approach in the field of engineering. 24 As
Senge writes,
115. Id. at4.
116. Id. at 4, 46-48.
117. Id. at3.
118. Todd, supra note 4, at 895.
119. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 190.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 188.
123. Id. at 191-92.
124. PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFrH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING
ORGANIZATION 6 (New York Doubleday 1990).
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[t]he DC-3, for the first time, brought together five critical compo-
nent technologies that formed a successful ensemble. They were: the
variable-pitch propeller, retractable landing gear, a type of light-
weight molded body construction called "monocoque," radial air-
cooled engine, and wing flaps. To succeed, the DC-3 needed all five;
four were not enough. 125
Law schools need to adopt such an approach to creating lawyers: a
comprehensive, integrated curriculum focused on developing a greater
range of the skills and perspectives lawyers need to succeed in practice.
As an institution, legal education must acknowledge the deficiencies of
the traditional methods of legal instruction and recognize that practical
legal skills and diverse perspectives, such as those emphasized in the
comprehensive law movement, are every bit as essential to a lawyer's
development as legal analysis.
Dean Erwin Griswold of Harvard Law School once stated that law
students need human relations and communication training because
"lawyers deal with people. They deal with people far more than they do
with appellate courts., 126 Similarly, in discussing attorneys' role in so-
ciety, former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said, "[w]e must be legal
architects, engineers, builders, and from time to time, inventors as well.
We have served, and must continue to see our role, as problem-solvers..
• .,,127 Law schools should respond to the calling of these two great scho-
lars and integrate the practical and non-traditional parts of their curricula
with the standard doctrinal training. In its recent study of American law
schools, the Carnegie Foundation advocated such an approach, urging
schools to "bridge the gap between analytical and practical knowledge"
by "unit[ing] the two sides of legal knowledge: formal knowledge and
experience of practice."'' 28 This requires numerous changes in the way
law schools approach legal training. While doctrinal instruction and
legal analysis are central to legal education, they should not overwhelm
the curriculum or represent "the exclusive content" of students' first-year
experience. 2 9 From the beginning of their law school experience, stu-
dents should be taught the importance of legal analysis to legal practice
but also its limits. Schools can promote such a perspective by, for exam-
ple, emphasizing other skills in their doctrinal classes, even while teach-
ing students how to narrowly analyze disputes in the traditional sense.
To illustrate, doctrinal classes could be taught using a team-based ap-
proach in which students are asked to analyze specific cases in small
groups. Professors can also ensure that extralegal concerns are not ig-
125. Id.
126. David M. Hunsaker, Law, Humanism, and Communication: Suggestions for Limited
Curricular Reform, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 417, 421 (1980).
127. Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1,5 (1993).
128. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 12.
129. Id. at 195.
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nored by discussing the social and moral consequences of specific re-
sults, or asking students to assume the role of a party's attorney and dis-
cuss how they would approach a particular case from both legal and non-
legal standpoints. We explicitly use such an approach in our courses by
encouraging students to incorporate extralegal goals and values into their
formalistic decision-making.
Law schools should also give students practical experience early on
by including in the first year curriculum at least one course that develops
practical skills and teaches students to "think like a lawyer" in simulated
practice settings. 130 The practical aspects of legal education should then
be expanded as students progress through law school, giving students an
increased opportunity to assume the responsibility of acting on behalf of
clients.' 3' In this manner, students would gradually transition from learn-
ing how to think like a lawyer to learning how to act like a lawyer. For
example, schools could construct various sequences of practical
courses--organized by, for instance, practice settings such as litigation
or transactional work-in which students would learn and apply compre-
hensive skills. A commonly-taught course that follows this model is a
pre-trial practice class, which typically builds on first-year civil proce-
dure and other doctrinal courses by requiring students to apply their ana-
lytical knowledge to a simulated legal dispute as it progresses from dis-
covery to trial. Law schools should also expand and refine their clinical
training and require students to perform supervised legal work while in
law school. 132 Ideally, students would work in small clinical groups and
meet weekly with their supervisor in a classroom setting to discuss their
experiences. By organizing clinics in this manner, schools would pro-
vide students with real-world experience and also a forum in which to
brainstorm, share ideas, and receive advice and feedback.
In addition to emphasizing practical knowledge, schools should also
seek to expose students to alternative perspectives, such as those that
comprise the comprehensive law movement, either integrated with exist-
ing classes or as free-standing courses. This would allow schools to
promote extralegal and interdisciplinary perspectives explicitly in addi-
tion to the implicit recognition such perspectives would receive in a more
integrated curriculum. Furthermore, law schools must give increased
emphasis to the ethical aspects of lawyering. Simply requiring a class on
professional conduct is insufficient; training in professional ethics should
be required earlier in law school and integrated with practice settings as
students progress so that they can more fully appreciate the manner in
which ethical and moral concerns impact their actions as practicing at-
torneys. For example, in our courses we often use practical simulations,
130. See id. at 188 (arguing that law schools should "employ well-elaborated case studies of
professional work" to teach students how to use their skills in practice settings).
131. Id. at 178.
132. Id.
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such as working with a client with diminished capacity, that require stu-
dents to account for moral and ethical concerns in addition to legal anal-
ysis. An example of a similar approach in a doctrinal course would be a
corporations professor teaching a hypothetical that required the students
to address the policy concerns behind the attorney reporting requirements
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. By integrating these types of concerns, law
schools can provide a structured framework for the "exploration and as-
sumption of the identity, values and dispositions consonant with the fun-
damental purposes of the legal profession."
' 133
The integration discussed above would dramatically improve legal
education by maximizing the impact of the second and third years of law
school and training students in a more complete set of skills. 13 4 It would
also, in and of itself, improve students' well-being and professional out-
look by creating more well-balanced, self-aware, and satisfied law school
graduates.135 But law schools must also "be responsive to both the needs
of our time and recent knowledge about how learning takes place."
136
Legal education as a whole needs to consider "the actual and potential
effects of the law school experience on the formation of future profes-
sionals"1 37 and engage in a self-critical examination of its teaching me-
thodologies. This requires a recognition of the effects of not only the
case method-which would be largely addressed by integrating the law
school curriculum-but also of the way we teach and test across the
board. If, as educators, we are truly committed to creating the best law-
yers possible rather than ranking students so that law firms can determine
who to hire, we must reevaluate the purpose of summative teaching and
testing in legal education. This is not to say that summative assessment
has no place in law school but rather that it should not be used to the
exclusion of other methods that would enhance learning. To the extent
possible, students should be evaluated periodically during the course of
every law school class, even those in which grades are determined pri-
marily on the basis of a final comprehensive exam. This would give
professors the chance to assess students' progress and give them feed-
back and students the opportunity to improve and maximize their learn-
ing experience in each course.
Finally, law schools should also explicitly address the personal im-
pact that their training-integrated or not-has on students. Legal edu-
cation has a tremendous impact on the way students think and view the
world; we cannot pretend that it does not also have an immeasurable
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., id. at 36-37 (discussing need for law schools to make better use of the second
and third years of law school).
135. See, e.g., Sheldon & Krieger: Negative Effects, supra note 73, at 28-33 (discussing the
negative effects of traditional legal education on students' well-being and job motivation and the
positive impact a more comprehensive approach to instruction would have).
136. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 24, at 12.
137. Id.
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effect on who students are as people (nor should we want to).1 8 When
the personal, intrinsic changes that occur during law school are ignored,
young lawyers enter the profession disillusioned, without a compass to
guide their professional growth. Yet, the professional identities that stu-
dents will carry with them into practice are forged from the intersection
of their personalities and their newly developed capacities and perspec-
tives. It is therefore essential that students develop a deep understanding
of both who they are as individuals and how the legal training they are
receiving can be integrated with their sense of self. To this end, law
schools must create focused opportunities for students to reflect on their
intrapersonal development. 139 Law schools must also help students de-
velop a self-awareness of who they want to be as professionals by en-
couraging them to integrate their intrinsic goals and needs with the prac-
tice area they choose to pursue.
CONCLUSION
In essence, what we are advocating is a legal education focused on
the practical and humanistic aspects of the profession to the same extent
as the theoretical. By critiquing the current state of legal education, we
do not purport to solve all of its ills. Education is fluid, and institutions
maximize their potential by remaining flexible and dynamic, not by ad-
hering to hard and fast rules. Change and growth are inevitable even
under a comprehensive, integrated view of legal education because law
schools must be responsive to the demands of the legal profession and
society. But we believe that the narrow perspective of traditional legal
education has become antiquated and that the comprehensive law move-
ment is the harbinger of a rapidly approaching paradigm shift in legal
education. By integrating the doctrinal and practical aspects of their cur-
ricula and providing direct training in the skills and perspectives outlined
herein, law schools would provide students with a much more compre-
hensive toolkit with which to view disputes. Students would enter the
legal profession as creative problem-solvers, rather than mere legal ana-
lysts. Such an approach would be much more consonant with society's
need for lawyers. We must not forget that the law is founded on the so-
cial and moral evolution of humankind, not merely black-letter treatises,
codes, or casebooks..
138. See, e.g., Joshua E. Perry, Thinking Like a Professional (unpublished essay on file with
the authors) ("Over the course of their legal education, our students evolve both personally and
professionally along complex and rich domains."); Parker J. Palmer, A New Professional: The Aims
of Education Revisited, CARNEGIE FOUNDATION, Nov./Dec. 2007,
http:llwww.camegiefoundation.org/change/sub.asp?key=98&subkey=2455 (discussing how profes-
sional education has a tendency to focus exclusively on objective, analytical perspectives at the
expense of important humanistic, emotional elements); Keeva, supra note 49, at 98 ("Almost no-
where in our modern lexicon does the use of the word practice suggest that side by side with acquir-
ing knowledge of our chosen field we are simultaneously called on to make an active, ongoing effort
to work with ourselves inwardly if we are to engage in the full practice of our profession.").
139. See Perry, supra note 138, at 9.
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